DELA TORRE V. COMELEC (G.R. No. 121592; July 5, 1996)

FACTS:

Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was disqualified from running as mayor of Cavinti Laguna on the ground that he was convicted of violation the Anti-Fencing Law.

He argues that he should not be disqualified because he is serving probation of his sentence and hence, the execution of his judgment was suspended together with all its legal consequences.

ISSUE:

WON Dela Torre is disqualified to run for public office.

HELD:

Sec.40 of LGC provides:

Disqualifications.

The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a)     Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;

Moral turopitude is considered as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Hence Dela Torre is disqualified from seeking public office.

With regard to his argument that he is under probation, the court ruled that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence.

Dela Torre's conviction subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.