VDA. DE GORDON V. CA (November 23, 1981)

FACTS:
Two parcels of land owned by Restituto Vda. De Gordon were sold by City Treasurer of Quezon City in a public auction to respondent Rosario Duazon because of unpaid taxes subject to redemption. The lands sold have assessed value of P16,800 and were sold for only P10,500.
Petitioner fails to redeem the property within the one year period. She contends that the sale is void because of inadequacy of price.

ISSUE:
WON the price for the lands is inadequate so as to render the sale invalid.

HELD:
Alleged gross inadequacy of price is not material "when the law gives the owner the right to redeem as when a sale is made at public auction, upon the theory that the lesser the price the easier it is for the owner to effect the redemption.

EREÑETA V. BEZORE (November 26, 1973)

FACTS:
Emilio Camon is a lessee of sugar plantation Hacienda Rosario. ½ of the plantation is owned by Petronila Alunan vda. De Santa Romana, Amparo Santa Romana and Alberta vda. De Hapon while the other half is owned by the appellants Bezore et al. Camon died and his widow Conception Ereñeta filed a petition for the grant of the letters of administration of the estate of his husband. Bezore at al. filed a claim against the estate of Camon amounting to P64,165 for sugar allotments, palay, allowances and rental.
Agreement to sell - whereby Bezore et al. agreed to sell their share to Romana et al.
Release and waiver of claims – Romana et al. released Camon from all the claims that may have accrued pertaining to the 2/4 pro indiviso share in Hacienda Rosario.
Deed of Sale- Bezore transferred to Romana et al. all their rights, title, interest and participation whether accrued or accruing in their 2/4 pro indiviso share in consideration of P78,000.

ISSUE:
WON the appellants have the right to claim over the estate of Camon.

HELD:
Appellants don’t have the right to claim over the estate of Camon because of the waiver of claims made by Romana et al, who are the now owner of hacienda Rosario.
The claim of the appellants that the waiver is not valid because it was made before the rights transferred were even sold to the Roman et al is of no merit. The waiver is subsequently cured by the sale of the rights of the appellants to Romana et al.
The court also finds no merit to the contention of the appellants that the sale has infirmity because of cheap consideration of 1,300 per hectare. Inadequacy of cause in a  contract does not of itself invalidate the contract.

DELA TORRE V. COMELEC (G.R. No. 121592; July 5, 1996)

FACTS:

Petitioner Rolando dela Torre was disqualified from running as mayor of Cavinti Laguna on the ground that he was convicted of violation the Anti-Fencing Law.

He argues that he should not be disqualified because he is serving probation of his sentence and hence, the execution of his judgment was suspended together with all its legal consequences.

ISSUE:

WON Dela Torre is disqualified to run for public office.

HELD:

Sec.40 of LGC provides:

Disqualifications.

The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a)     Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence;

Moral turopitude is considered as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

In this case of fencing, actual knowledge by the "fence" of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one's rightful property as that which animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Hence Dela Torre is disqualified from seeking public office.

With regard to his argument that he is under probation, the court ruled that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence.

Dela Torre's conviction subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending resolution of the application for probation.

RIVERA III V. COMELEC G.R. No. 167591 May 9, 2007

FACTS:

A petition for cancelation of the Certificate of Candidacy of Marino Morales as mayoralty candidate in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the May 2004 mayoralty was filed on the ground the he already served three consecutive terms in the office he seeks to run.

Morales argues that this is not so because although he really served in 1995-1998 (1^st term) and 2004-2007 (3^rd term), he was merely a caretaker or de facto mayor in 1998-2001(2^nd term) because his election was declared void by the RTC due to an election protest.

Comelec ruled that Morales already served his third term and after an MR was filed, declared it final and executory on May 14, 2004.

ISSUE:

WON Morales had already served his 3 consecutive terms and if so, who should take his position.

HELD:

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.

Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term.

Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely".

With regard to the person who will replace Morales, it is a rule that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Since his disqualification became final and executory after the elections, the candidate having the second highest number of votes cannot assume the position. Hence, it is the petitioner, the elected Vice Mayor Anthony Dee who should be declared as the mayor.

CAYAT V. COMELEC G.R. No. 163776 April 24, 2007

FACTS:

Fr.Nardo Cayat and Thomas Palileng are the only mayoralty candidates for the May 2004 elections in Buguias Benguet.

Palileng filed a petition for cancellation of the COC of Cayat on the ground of misrepresentation. Palileng argues that Cayat misrepresents himself when he declared in his COC that he is eligible to run as mayor when in fact he is not because he is serving probation after being convicted for the offense of acts of lasciviousness.

Comelec, granted the petition of Palileng and Cayat filed a motion for reconsideration. Such, MR was denied because Cayat failed to pay the filing fee and hence, it was declared final and executory.

Despite this decision, Cayat was still proclaimed as the winner and Palileng filed a petition for annulment of proclamation. Comelec declared Palileng as the duly elected mayor and Feliseo Bayacsan as the duly elected vice mayor.

Bayacsan argues that he should be declared as mayor because of the doctrine of rejection of second placer.

ISSUE:

WON the rejection of second placer doctrine is applicable.

HELD:

The doctrine cannot be applied in this case because the disqualification of Cayat became final and executory before the elections and hence, there is only one candidate to speak of.

The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. As such, Palileng is the only candidate and the duly elected mayor.

The doctrine will apply in Bayacsan’s favor, regardless of his intervention in the present case, if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification remained pending on election day, 10 May 2004, resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates for Buguias, Benguet in the elections; and (2) the decision on Cayat’s disqualification became final only after the elections.